This Policy describes how Stealed SAS ("Stealed", "we") collects, uses, retains, discloses and protects personal data across the stealed.io website, the application, the APIs and related services (the "Platform").
It covers two distinct processing activities, and the distinction matters: the building of our Corpus, for which we act as controller, and the monitoring of a customer's perimeter, for which we act as that customer's processor. Section 2 sets out this split.
Stealed detects compromised corporate credentials already circulating in criminal ecosystems, and alerts the organisation that legitimately owns the affected domain so that it can protect itself. We do not hack anyone, we never test a credential, and we allow no one to search for data outside their own perimeter.
We collect and index login credentials exposed in data breaches and criminal ecosystems. For this activity, Stealed is the controller.
Legal basis: legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR), as recognised by Recital 49, which expressly designates network and information security as a legitimate interest, including for providers of security technologies and services. A written legitimate interest assessment documents this balancing test.
When a customer entrusts us with monitoring its domains, that customer is the controller and Stealed is a processor within the meaning of Article 28 GDPR. A search mandate formalises the customer's instruction and defines the perimeter. Where the customer works through an integration partner, the contractual chain cascades: the customer authorises its partner in writing to engage Stealed as a sub-processor.
| Processing | Stealed's capacity | Legal basis |
|---|---|---|
| Building and maintaining the Corpus | Controller | Legitimate interest, Art. 6(1)(f) |
| Monitoring the declared perimeter | Processor for the customer | The customer's legitimate interest |
| Platform user accounts | Controller | Performance of the contract |
| Onboarding emails after a space is opened | Controller | Legitimate interest, Art. 6(1)(f) |
| Exposure diagnostic and pre-contractual demonstration | Controller | Legitimate interest, Art. 6(1)(f) |
| Online booking and commercial follow-up of the request | Controller | Legitimate interest, Art. 6(1)(f) |
| Newsletter, on a box ticked in the booking form | Controller | Consent, Art. 6(1)(a) |
| Commercial management and billing | Controller | Contract and legal obligation |
Data can be collected, retained and disclosed, and these three states are independent. A log produced by malware is captured exactly as that malware produced it: we do not choose what it contains. Most of the categories below are collected and retained without ever being disclosed to anyone.
| Category | Collected | Retained | Disclosed |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credentials: login, password, service | Yes | Yes | Yes, password masked by default |
| Session cookies | Yes | Yes | Under development |
| Application tokens | Yes | Yes | Under development |
| Secrets and environment variables | Yes | Yes | Under development |
| Compromised machine fingerprints | Yes | Yes | Partially, as investigation context |
| Credential / machine correlation | Yes | Yes | Not used to date |
| Operating system credentials | Yes | Yes | Not used to date |
| Autofill data | Yes | Yes | Not used to date |
| Browsing history | Yes | Yes | No security use, not intended for disclosure |
| Payment card data | Yes | Yes | No security use, not intended for disclosure |
We state this distinction rather than a general claim of non-processing, which would be inaccurate: minimisation is effective at disclosure, it is not yet effective at collection or retention. What to do with the categories collected but not disclosed is covered by the retention plan described in paragraph 8.
The categories that directly extend the security purpose, session cookies, application tokens, secrets and environment variables, are under development: a valid session cookie bypasses authentication and second factor as surely as a password, and an exposed secret opens an entire system. They will not go live before our counsel has advised on the conditions of such disclosure. Categories with no security use for the monitored organisation, chiefly browsing history and payment card data, are not intended to be disclosed.
Leak data originates from breaches already in circulation, never caused by us. Collection is automated, continuous, and operated by our own processing chain, today on semi-public distribution channels. Other families of sources are being integrated, and each is assessed before being connected. The detail is set out in the collection policy.
We do not buy any data and depend on no data broker. We pay no actor to obtain a dataset, whether directly or through a third party. The origin of each source is documented in an internal register.
The origin of the data, the sources monitored, what Stealed refrains from doing and the procedure applicable to any extension of collection are described in detail in the collection policy, which is binding on Stealed.
We do not disclose the exact identity of our sources: a disclosed channel is a lost channel, which would deprive all of our customers of detection. Customers receive a qualitative categorisation of the source, never its name, its link, or access to the original archive, which contains data concerning third-party organisations.
Onboarding emails after a space is opened. When a free space is opened for your business email address, we send you a short series of onboarding emails: getting started with the service, what to do when a credential is exposed, and the option to book a conversation with our team. The legal basis is legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR): making a professional aware of, and able to use, the service they have just opened, in the course of their work. The data passed to our email provider is your email address, your first and last name, the domain of your address, the profile you declared (customer or service provider), the language of the page you used and the state of your onboarding. These emails contain no leak data. Every email includes a one-click unsubscribe link, and you can object to this processing at any time by writing to privacy@stealed.io.
Contact by our team about the analysis. When you open your space from the result of an exposure diagnostic, our team may contact you about that analysis. The legal basis is legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR): talking, between professionals and in the course of their work, about a result the visitor has just viewed. You can object to this contact at any time by writing to privacy@stealed.io, and every email includes a one-click unsubscribe link. When you declare yourself a service provider, the domain you tested before opening your space is kept with your request and passed to our customer relationship tool, to prepare the conversation with our partner team; it is never shown in the Platform nor returned publicly.
Online booking. When you book a conversation from the website, you answer a few questions (your need, your contact details, your company and your project), then you choose a time slot in the calendar, which is displayed by the website itself; the available time slots and the booking go through the interface of our appointment booking provider, which is called only at your request. The information entered is recorded in our customer relationship management tool (person record, company record, follow-up note) as soon as you leave the contact details step, with your name and e-mail address, then completed at the end of the project step with all your other answers, even if no meeting is finally booked, in order to get back to you about your request; a bot check protects each of these two recordings. It is also passed to the appointment booking provider when you confirm the meeting, in order to prepare the conversation and follow it up. The legal basis is legitimate interest (Article 6(1)(f) GDPR): answering a professional's request, in the course of their work. You can object to this processing and ask for your record to be erased at any time by writing to privacy@stealed.io.
Newsletter. The booking form offers a box, unticked by default, to receive the Stealed newsletter. It is sent only to people who ticked it: when you tick it, your e-mail address is also added to our e-mail provider, Loops, so that we can send you the newsletter. The legal basis is consent (Article 6(1)(a) GDPR). You can withdraw your consent at any time, from the unsubscribe link in each e-mail or by writing to privacy@stealed.io, without affecting the mailings sent before the withdrawal.
Leak data is never used for named prospecting. No individual appearing in the Corpus is contacted commercially on that basis.
Individuals whose credentials appear in our Corpus did not provide us with their data and do not necessarily have a reliable contact channel, that data having been exfiltrated by malicious third parties and involving very large volumes. Informing them individually would involve disproportionate effort within the meaning of Article 14(5)(b) GDPR.
This section constitutes the public information required by that provision, as a compensating measure. The safeguards applied are: no public access to the Corpus, no free-search capability, detailed disclosure restricted to the owner of the domain and to the partner it has mandated, credentials only masked before any mandate, password masked by default and readable in clear only under the conditions of the security policy, data minimisation, and the retention periods set out in section 8.
Any individual may exercise their rights by writing to privacy@stealed.io. Certain requests may be restricted by compelling legitimate grounds relating to security; where this applies, we explain the reasons.
The model is one of targeted disclosure, not a search engine. In practice:
The extent of accessible data is determined by the customer's state, never by the type of action. The more identifying the data disclosed, the stricter the framework required. No state is stored: each is derived from recorded facts, and therefore cannot be forced by hand.
| State | What is accessible | Duration |
|---|---|---|
| Under analysis | Aggregated indicators, exposure score and volumes, and the list of occurrences with their identity masked server-side. No password. No customer is created. | 24 hours, then referenced or erased |
| Referenced | Daily indicators and the list of occurrences with their identity masked server-side. No credential is routed to a workspace. Password locked, the display function does not exist. | At most three years from the last commercial contact or, failing that, from the referencing; aggregated indicators are not limited |
| Monitored | Real monitoring, reserved for Stealed's internal workspaces. | No commercial clock |
| POC | Detail of the perimeter's occurrences: credentials, hosts, dates, recurrence. Conditional on attestation of a customer mandate. | 15 days, extendable on a logged reason |
| Billed | Same detail. In operated mode the provider alone uses the workspace; in autonomous mode the customer has their own. | Contract term |
| Archived | Workspace closed, perimeter data deleted. Logs remain. | — |
The raw source file is not retained: it is analysed, the useful information is extracted, and it is then deleted. Retention is then organised in three layers:
| Category | Period |
|---|---|
| Downloaded source archive | Deleted immediately after analysis |
| Ingestion and routing tables (global scope) | Short lifetimes, automatic purge |
| Credential registry and normalised extracts (global scope) | No time limit to date. A retention plan is established, see below |
| Masked credentials of an organisation referenced by a partner | Three years from the last recorded commercial contact with the organisation or, failing that, from the referencing. Aggregated indicators are not subject to this period |
| Data attached to a customer's perimeter | For as long as the domain is monitored. Automatic and immediate deletion when the domain is removed or the relationship ends |
| Domain submitted for exposure diagnostic | Kept with the date of the search for 24 months at most, the IP address being cleared after 12 months; the computed result is cached for 24 hours |
| Domain tested by a service provider before opening their space | Kept with the opening request and passed to our customer relationship tool to prepare the partner conversation: 24 months at most, the IP address being cleared after 12 months |
| Account data | Duration of the contractual relationship, then applicable statutory periods |
| Booking data and commercial follow-up record | Duration of the commercial relationship, then three years at most from the last contact |
| Newsletter subscription | Until you unsubscribe |
| Decision and consultation logs | Durable for decisions, sensitivity-indexed for consultations |
The precise periods applicable to each category are documented and disclosed to customers and partners under the contractual framework. The detail is set out in the security policy.
Account data is retained for the duration of the contractual relationship, then for the applicable statutory periods. Technical and consultation logs are retained according to their sensitivity.
A retention plan is established for the global-scope stocks, to replace the absence of a limit with a determined period on the secret held in clear, the credential and the domain remaining necessary for detection. The period will be established by measurement rather than set arbitrarily. That plan is not yet executed, and this page will be updated when it is. Conversely, deletion of the data attached to a customer's perimeter is structural: it depends on no task to trigger and no delay.
Leak data, which is the core of the service, is hosted and processed in France, on the infrastructure of a French provider, in the Paris region, with no exposure to extraterritorial legislation such as the CLOUD Act. Its encrypted backups are held there too. No leak data leaves French territory.
Certain peripheral functions, which process no leak data, rely on providers established outside the European Union: user authentication for the Platform, the sending of notification and onboarding emails and of the newsletter, and online appointment booking. The first two involve account and contact data, the third commercial contact data. The authentication provider does not offer hosting in the European Union, and the booking provider processes data in the United States. These transfers are governed by an EU-US Data Privacy Framework certification and by the European Commission's standard contractual clauses. Our customer relationship management tool is operated by a United States company but hosted in Frankfurt, with the same clauses for any transfer outside the European Union. The Sub-processors page states, for each provider, its hosting region and the applicable mechanism.
The full list of our sub-processors, their role, their location and the categories of data involved is published on our Sub-processors page, which is kept up to date.
The technical and organisational measures, each with its actual deployment status, are set out in the security policy. In summary:
You have the rights of access, rectification, erasure, objection, restriction and portability, under the conditions set out in the GDPR. Requests should be sent to privacy@stealed.io.
You also have the right to lodge a complaint with the French data protection authority (CNIL), www.cnil.fr, or with your local supervisory authority.
The Platform is intended exclusively for professionals and is not directed at individuals under eighteen. We do not knowingly collect account data concerning minors.
This Policy may be revised. Any substantial change is signalled on this page by an update to its date, and communicated to customers under contract.
Related documents: collection policy, security policy, sub-processors, cookies, acceptable use, terms of use.